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Abstract 
The paper with the title “Public Response to 9/11 
in Politics: Patriotism, Fear and Language Issues” 
examines the immediate responses that emerged 
in American political administration after the 
terrorist attacks on 11 September, 2001 in New 
York City and Washington, D.C. Moreover, the 
paper analyzes the speech “We Have Seen the 
State of Our Union” given before the Congress on 
September 20, 2001, by the former U.S. President 
George H. W. Bush, showing the prevalent man-
ner of the rhetoric of the then current government 
administration. Seeking to explain the rhetoric of 
the politicians after 9/11, the analysis explores 
several parameters. This kind of rhetoric ad-
dressed the issues connected to 9/11, and em-
ployed a great deal of patriotism-related words as 
well as a language that could help instigate fear 
and paranoia in Americans and their culture. 
 
Sažetak 
Rad s naslovom "Javni odgovor na 9/11 u politici: 
patriotizam, strah i jezični problemi" istražuje 
neposredne reakcije koje su se pojavile u 
američkoj političkoj administraciji nakon teroris-
tičkih napada 11. rujna 2001. u New Yorku i 
Washingtonu. U članku se analizira govor 
"Vidjeli smo stanje naše zajednice" koji je pred 
Kongresom 20. rujna 2001. godine dao bivši 
američki predsjednik George H.W. Bush, koji 
pokazuje prevladavajući način retorike tadašnje 
vladine administracije. U potrazi za objašnjavan-
jem retorike političara nakon 11. rujna, analiza 
istražuje nekoliko parametara. Ova vrsta retorike 
govorila je o pitanjima vezanim za 11. rujna, a 
koristila je mnogo riječi povezanih sa patriotiz-
mom, kao i jezik koji bi mogao potaknuti strah i 




The destruction on 9/11 of American symbols 
that were highly valued by American society un-
dermined the feeling of safety in the USA. With 
the assault on the World Trade Center and the 
Pentagon, American prosperity, and financial and 
military power were under attack. The initial reac-
tion was shock, general angst and trauma, later 
followed by more insight and even self-reflection.  
The crisis, being a mass global event, was wit-
nessed by the entire world, and it truly exhibited 
many traits of a televised blockbuster. Philoso-
pher and cultural critic Slavoj Žižek suggests that 
9/11 occurred as much on television as it did at 
the site of the attacks, the World Trade Center and 
the Pentagon. He further affirms that, with the TV 
spectacle of the attacks, people “were introduced 
to the ‘desert of the real’” as “the landscape and 
the shots of the collapsing towers could not but be 
reminiscent of the most breathtaking scenes in big 
catastrophe productions” /1/. The footage of the 
World Trade Center towers falling was constantly 
repeated by the news media, and Žižek recalls 
that, “days after September 11, 2001, our gaze was 
transfixed by the images of the plane hitting one 
of the WTC towers, we were all forced to experi-
ence the ‘compulsion to repeat’ and jouissance 
beyond the pleasure principle1: we wanted to see 
                                                          
1 Žižek has adopted Lacanian terminology in his philosophical 
writing. See Jacques Lacan's Seminars, The Ethics of Psychoanal-
ysis. 
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it again and again; the same shots were repeated 
ad nauseam…” /2/. It seems that because of the 
ongoing repetition of the towers collapsing, peo-
ple now associate the attacks almost exclusively 
with the WTC. Sandra Silberstein agrees: “The 
twin towers, a symbol of New York, became the 
symbol of “The Attack on America” /3/. Marc 
Redfield validates Silberstein’s claim and explains 
that this is the case, because the socio-
geographical space inhabited by the World Trade 
Center was (and is) so heavily mediatized, so 
utterly penetrated by representational technolo-
gies of global reach, and so symbolically at the 
heart of the world’s various political, financial, 
and semiotic webs of power that the destruction 
of the towers could not help being at once the 
ultimate media event and (therefore) a haunting 
image of the deracinating force of communica-
tional technology at work, disseminating images 
of disaster from the symbolic center of technologi-
cal, capitalist, and national power /4/. The aim of 
this paper, however, is to analyze the public re-
sponses in American politics to the 9/11 attacks, 
and not to summarize the events of 9/11. The re-
search examines the consequences of these attacks 
for broader U.S. culture through the language of 
politics. Paranoia and fear, too often encouraged 
through media and by the U.S. government, have 
always been constituent parts of American society 
and culture. David Altheide, who has been identi-
fying and researching fear in American media 
with the help of content analysis, asserts: “Crime 
and threats to the public order—and therefore all 
good citizens—are part of the focus of fear, but 
the topics change over time” /5/. Altheide interro-
gates the “politics of fear,” since the USA has 
managed to find threats to the American nation 
throughout history. After 9/11 the media explod-
ed with coverage on terrorism, which was at the 
time the most recent emergent peril to the United 
States, soon followed by the anthrax threat. After 
the attacks on 9/11, the majority of Americans 
again felt insecure, worried and terrified. It was 
made worse for Americans since this was the first 
major attack that happened directly on American 
soil. Moreover, the leaders (with the help of the 
media) additionally helped to magnify the events 
with the use of expansive rhetorical gestures that 
pushed many American citizens deeper into feel-
ings of despair. This effect has been well-
documented in numerous studies. In his book 
Terror Post 9/11 and the Media, Altheide observes, 
“Numerous public opinion polls indicated that 
audiences were influenced by news-media reports 
about the attacks as well as the interpretations of 
the causes, culprits, and, ultimately, the support 
for various U.S. military actions” /5/. Media re-
peatedly emphasized the fear of terrorism, and 
Altheide recalls that former fear stories in the 
media were now converted into the “terror story”: 
“Sorrow, suffering, empathy, and pain were 
merged with fear and vengeance” /5/. In one of 
his earlier books from 2006, Altheide noted: “The 
collective identity of victim of terrorist attacks 
was promoted by news reports stressing commu-
nal suffering, as well as opportunities to partici-
pate in helping survivors and in defeating terror-
ism” /5/. The responses were indeed multifaceted. 
A Gallup Poll2 from December 21, 2001, Religion in 
the Aftermath of September 11 shows that there was 
an increased level of attendance at religious insti-
tutions for a short time in the aftermath, but levels 
quickly returned to those of pre-9/11 church at-
tendance.3  
Moreover, there was an upsurge in patriotism and 
nationalistic thinking after the attacks. In their 
book In the Wake of 9/11: The Psychology of Terror, 
Tom Pyszczynski, Sheldon Solomon and Jeff 
Greenberg, who developed Terror Management 
Theory (TMT), report the following: 
Flags literally flew off the shelves and appeared 
everywhere, on cars, buildings, people’s T-shirts, 
and even their skin in the form of tattoos. Ban-
ners, posters, T-shirts, and billboards proclaiming 
“United we stand,” “Proud to be an American,” 
and “God Bless America” seemed to appear eve-
rywhere. Corporate logos were quickly retooled 
in patriotic colors of red, white, and blue /6/.  
Soon after the attacks, shopping and spending 
became two of the most important patriotic activi-
ties. Roger Lowenstein, an accomplished journal-
ist for the Wall Street Journal illustrated his point 
thus: “Since the World Trade Center attack, it has 
been suggested that our patriotic duty now con-
sists of investing in the stock market” /7/.  
The fact that patriotism intensified in the months 
following the attacks was also confirmed by an-
                                                          
2 On their webpage, Gallup writes about their methodolo-
gy center: “We are committed to using scientifically proven 
and accepted methodologies for Gallup polling in more than 
160 countries and areas worldwide. Gallup applies rigorous 
research standards to its Gallup Daily tracking, Gallup Poll 
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other Gallup Poll; i.e. Have Americans Changed? 
from September 11, 2002. The survey results are 
summarized on their webpage: “America experi-
enced a burst of patriotism last fall that was re-
flected in near unanimous public support for 
President George W. Bush, in heightened approv-
al of Congress and the two major parties, and in 
elevated levels of trust in government to handle 
international and domestic problems alike” (Gal-
lup Poll). The poll admits that these severely pat-
riotic reactions were rather short-term, and that 
the attacks did not have a lasting effect of change 
on Americans, as had first been anticipated.  
The same poll, however, not merely vali-
dated that American people were engaging in 
patriotic activities in the immediate aftermath, but 
also asserted the presence of a fear factor among 
Americans:  
Prior to Sept. 11, in a Gallup Poll taken in April 
2001, only 4% of Americans said they were “very 
worried” about the chances of becoming a victim 
of terrorism or of a family member becoming a 
victim; another 20% were “somewhat worried.” In 
the first two months after Sept. 11, those figures 
increased sharply. A mid-October poll found 
close to one-quarter of Americans “very worried” 
about terrorism striking their own lives, and an-
other third were “somewhat worried,” for a total 
of 59% feeling worried. (Gallup Poll)4 
Furthermore, a certain rhetoric was con-
stantly tied to the events of 9/11, initially on the 
side of politicians (“war on terror,” “attack,” “us 
against them,” “their war against us,” “good vs. 
evil,” the Patriot Act, rendition, “axis of evil,” 
patriotism, threat, horror, etc.) as the leaders, who 
also presented themselves as the potential saviors, 
instrumentalized paranoia to follow an alternate 
plan. The idea of spreading fear on the side of 
politics has been presented in a range of studies. 
Moreover, Altheide argues that “tying terrorism 
coverage to an expansive discourse of fear has 
contributed to the emergence of politics of fear, or 
decision makers’ promotion and use of audience 
beliefs and assumptions about danger, risk, and 
fear in order to achieve certain goals” /5/. Several 
scholars, including Phillip Wander, who coined 
the term ‘prophetic dualism’ in 1984, have called 
this type of divisive rhetoric for dividing the 
world into two parts, i.e. into good and evil, into us 
and them as President Bush did after the attacks. 




In her 2012 thesis “From Crisis to War: Prophetic 
Dualism in President Bush’s September 20, 2001 
Address,” Rachel E. Potucek provides a clear def-
inition of prophetic dualism by Jamie Warner, 
who has extensively studied the concept of pro-
phetic dualism in the United States: “Prophetic 
dualism is a moralistic foreign policy narrative 
that divides the world into two stark opposing 
forces of “good” and “evil” and asserts America’s 
God-given superiority over the evil foe” /8/.    
The paper will take a look at the rhetoric 
of dualism in the political arena after 9/11 on the 
example of the first speech after the attacks, held 
before the Congress on September 20, 2001, by the 
former U.S. President George H. W. Bush. Addi-
tionally, the paper will demonstrate that the polit-
ical language of the time employs a rhetorical 
strategy that helps spreading fear and promoting 
patriotism.  
 
Public Response to 9/11 in Politics  
After 9/11, patriotism in the USA escalat-
ed, an effect which was first visible in political 
language. It is not an easy task to pinpoint the 
definition of patriotism and/or nationalism; how-
ever, researchers seem to agree that they are both 
political concepts, since they have been closely 
related to the state throughout history. Some re-
searchers like Charles Taylor and Maurizio Viroli 
see them as separate concepts, whereas Alasdair 
MacIntyre perceives them almost as synonymous. 
Rogers Brubaker also poses an intriguing ques-
tion, “What does it mean to speak ‘in the name of 
the nation’?” /9/. In comparing patriotism and 
nationalism, Brubaker concludes that they “are 
not things with fixed natures; they are highly 
flexible political languages, ways of framing polit-
ical arguments by appealing to the patria, the fa-
therland, the country, the nation. These terms 
have somewhat different connotations and reso-
nances, and the political languages of patriotism 
and nationalism are therefore not fully overlap-
ping” /9/. In his article “Patriotism and Human 
Rights: An Argument for Unpatriotic Patriotism,” 
Andrew Vincent addresses patriotism as a notion 
signifying “a specific loyalty consequent upon 
particular membership of a country, or, more 
usually, a state. In this sense patriotism is always 
marked out as a particular loyalty” /10/. Vincent 
adds that “the loyalties demanded from the patri-
ot are simply to whatever values are regarded as 
dominant within a state or community” /10/. He 
further distinguishes between strong and moder-
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ate patriotism, with strong patriotism demanding 
complete loyalty. Similarly, Leonie Huddy and 
Nadia Khatib propose a difference between “con-
structive and blind patriotism” /11/. They describe 
blind patriotism as the reluctance to criticize and 
consider criticism of the homeland or nation. They 
equate blind patriots as “typically conservative,” 
since blind patriotism “is both ideologically divi-
sive and closely aligned with nationalism and 
ethnocentrism, blurring the distinction between 
patriotism and nationalism” /12/. Vincent’s con-
cept of strong patriotism and Huddy’s and Khat-
ib’s category of blind patriotism could be inter-
preted as nationalism or at least on the verge of 
nationalism, which is thus regarded as stronger 
than patriotism. On the one hand, patriotism is 
often merely love of homeland, allowing criticism 
and consideration. Yet, Vincent argues that even 
with patriotism, “love of country is not love of a 
language or ethnicity, but rather of political liber-
ty” /10/, referring in his article to the U.S. and 
possibly the European Union. Nationalism, on the 
other hand, is always imperceptive of any self-
reflection in the sense that it attempts to avoid 
admitting to any faults. Still, the boundaries be-
tween the two remain somewhat blurred and 
indistinct. In this paper, the researcher will follow 
Brubaker and those who explain patriotism and 
nationalism as two separate concepts. Further-
more, one can notice that the 9/11 responses in 
politics were definitely at least on the verge of 
nationalism, when the politicians and later the 
media presented America’s exceptionalism, de-
mocracy, freedom, prosperity and consumerism 
as the greatest American virtues, employing lan-
guage that was ideologically divisive. So, in ac-
cordance with Vincent’s claim mentioned above, 
these are the values expected from American pa-
triots. Moreover, Redfield confirms the presence 
of nationalism in U.S. culture: “The atavistic na-
tionalism so prominent in U.S. political and mass-
mediated culture has, in my view, much to do 
with the political, technical, and socioeconomic 
developments that led twentieth-century “mass 
culture” per se to be tagged as “American” /4/.  
In his nationally televised speech “We 
Have Seen the State of Our Union” given before 
the Congress on September 20, 2001, former U.S. 
President George H. W. Bush commended the 
American nation “for their resolve while pledging 
to use the country’s armed forces in a ‘war on 
terror” /12/. In 2002, Silberstein published the 
book War of Words: Language, Politics and 9/11, 
where she assigned the motivational, but especial-
ly highly pedagogical style of Bush’s rhetoric to 
his speech, “which is high on realism and certain-
ty,” with the aim “to demonstrate thoughtful de-
liberation” /3/. However, in her analysis she soon 
conceded that another characteristic of his speech 
was “strategic misrepresentation” with “other 
potential omissions” /3/; e.g. Bush avoided 
providing answers as to why war was the only 
way to conquer terrorism. 
In the immediate aftermath, President 
Bush and his administration instantly declared a 
war against terrorism, later shortened to a ‘war on 
terror’, seeking revenge for the injustice suffered 
by the American nation: “Tonight we are a coun-
try awakened to danger and called to defend 
freedom. Our grief has turned to anger, and anger 
to resolution. Whether we bring our enemies to 
justice, or bring justice to our enemies, justice will 
be done” /13/. He stated that the “enemies of free-
dom [had] committed an act of war against our 
country,”5 and in the continuation of his speech 
he disclosed that, after collecting evidence, they 
had identified the enemies as “a collection of 
loosely affiliated terrorist organizations known as 
al-Qaeda” /13/. He also explained why the alleged 
enemies of freedom hated America, and the rea-
son behind their animosity appeared rather sim-
ple: “They hate our freedoms—our freedom of 
religion, our freedom of speech, our freedom to 
vote and assemble and disagree with each other” 
/13/. Silberstein agrees when analyzing his speech 
that, “[t]his [the characterization] is, at best, a 
simplification” /3/. This highly patriotic speech6 
does not involve even the slightest trace of self-
reflection or self-criticism, or consideration of 
whether America had done wrong in the past, 
since the attacks are ascribed only to envy of 
                                                          
5 Krista de Castella and Craig McGarty conducted an ap-
praisal theory-based content analysis “to systematically exam-
ine emotional appeal in the political rhetoric of three former 
Western leaders” (De Castella and McGarty 92). They con-
firmed that Bush’s divisive rhetoric constitutes “bipolar repre-
sentation of “us” and “them” and the portrayal of the “evil 
other” with language that is simplistic, dichotomous, and 
reductionistic” (De Castella and McGarty 87). The second and 
third theme that are characteristic for the “war narrative,” as 
they put it, are “the depiction of terrorists as motivated chiefly 
by a hatred of the (in this case, Western) values” and “infor-
mation “security,” secrecy, and opacity” (De Castella and 
McGarty 88). All three themes coincide with Bush’s rhetorical 
strategy, as will be shown in this paper. 
6 De Castella and McGarty also recognized “patriotic ap-
peals to unity and strength” in Bush’s speeches (de Castella 
and McGarty 95). 
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American prosperity and privileges, such as free-
dom. Such responses are no longer merely patriot-
ic, but already rather nationalistic. Žižek thus 
proposes that it is vital to “deconstruct, doubt, 
distantiate oneself” from these exact ‘freedoms’ 
/1/. Žižek doubts this (Western) illusion of free-
dom with governments wishing to control all 
aspects of life, and states that “our ‘freedoms’ 
themselves serve to mask and sustain our deeper 
unfreedom” /1/. 
Nevertheless, in such traumatic times, it is 
normal to feel shock, grief and even anger, and 
people need reassuring words. Yet in his speech, 
Bush attempted to console the American nation 
by further instilling fear among the American 
people and presenting himself and his govern-
ment as the ones who would help save America 
from these enemies and protect Americans and 
their land. “Our nation—this generation—will lift 
a dark threat of violence from our people and our 
future […] We will not tire, we will not falter, and 
we will not fail”7 /13/ . Altheide writes that the 
reassurance of keeping America safe was deliv-
ered in the manner of “near-hysterical calls” in 
the “propaganda of fear, hate, and control” /5/. 
Additionally, Bush’s language appeared threaten-
ing, setting himself and the government far-
reaching goals and making unrealistic promises: 
“The Taliban must act and act immediately. They 
will hand over the terrorists, or they will share in 
their fate […] Our war on terror begins with al-
Qaeda, but it does not end there. It will not end 
until every terrorist group of global reach has 
been found, stopped, and defeated” /13/. He con-
tinued to issue threats against the enemies: “We 
will starve terrorists of funding, turn them one 
against another, drive them from place to place, 
until there is no refuge or rest” /13/. Bush also 
adopted the radical and divisive rhetoric of our 
side vs. their side, of good vs. evil, civilization vs. 
primitivism, leaving little room for options and 
thus creating a false dichotomy. For him, the mat-
ter seemed basic: “Every nation, in every region, 
now has a decision to make. Either you are with 
us, or you are with the terrorists” /13/. Žižek pos-
es several rhetorical questions on the choice be-
tween ‘democracy and fundamentalism,’ which 
are the two poles that Bush wanted to differenti-
ate between: “Is it not that, within the terms of 
                                                          
7 De Castella and McGarty claim that fear has been offered 
“as tool of coercion that promises citizens increased protection 
only if they consent to the policy changes and measures advo-
cated by their leaders” (De Castella and McGarty 90). 
this choice, it is simply not possible to choose 
‘fundamentalism’? What is problematic in the 
way the ruling ideology imposes this choice on us 
is not ‘fundamentalism’ but, rather, democracy 
itself: as if the only alternative to ‘fundamentalism’ 
is the political system of liberal parliamentary 
democracy” /1/. Such a political perspective is, of 
course, deceptive, and the solutions offered seem 
too simplistic, even blinding. Martha Stout claims 
that this standpoint of the American government 
provides “an extra boost to our [American] well-
known sentiments of being the biggest and best, 
but it also abandons us [Americans] in a danger-
ous position of ignorance regarding the actual 
roots and possible futures of terrorism” /14/. Even 
more, in 9/11: The Culture of Memorialization, Da-
vid Simpson offers what might seem a surprising 
twist in comprehending the Derridean concept of 
the “autoimmune system of the West,” promoted 
by the Bush administration and also proposed by 
Stout: “Every imagining of the other is an encoun-
ter with the self: they are us. The phantasm of in-
ternational terror—everywhere and always, un-
seen and ready to strike—is the reflection of glob-
al capitalism ...” /15/. 
Resorting to this kind of rhetoric on the 
part of the U.S. authorities, i.e. the rhetoric of fear 
and general panic, is not new in American society. 
After reading or listening to Bush’s speeches, one 
is reminded of the rhetoric in the style of John 
Wayne and the Wild West, ‘wanted dead or alive’. 
Public fear-mongering has been part of American 
culture since the USA was founded as a country, a 
hypothesis found in many critical works and also 
in Samuel Chase Coale’s article “Conspiracy and 
Paranoia in Contemporary American Politics and 
Fiction: The Mouse and the Snake.” Moreover, 
Coale perceives President Bush “as the product in 
many ways of the American apocalyptic, para-
noid, fundamentalist right wing in politics” /16/, 
also claiming that, “Paranoia and conspiracy are 
… as American as apple pie and violence” /16/. 
One can think of many instances of fear-
mongering, paranoia and consequently conspira-
cy thinking in the U.S. history. In the article “The 
Politics of Terrorism Fears,” Richard Jackson 
enumerates several occasions of fear in the U.S. 
history of fear: “Historical responses to the fear of 
violent anarchists, communists, the dangers of 
illegal drugs, rogue states, and weapons of mass 
destruction, for example, provide a ready-made 
set of interpretive frames and strategic responses 
…” /17/. Jackson calls American culture, a “cul-
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ture of fear,” and cannot cease to provide exam-
ples of “seemingly dangerous categories of peo-
ple” that were at different times in U.S. history 
represented as threats to the American nation (of 
course, according to U.S. authorities): “the various 
“red scares” of the frontier confrontations with 
Native Americans, the Palmer Raids, and McCar-
thyism in the 1950s; the “brown scare” of German 
citizens during the two world wars; and the “yel-
low scare” of Japanese Americans in World War II 
that led to the incarceration of thousands of inno-
cent Japanese people in concentration camps /17/. 
Several other examples will be revealed subse-
quently.  
In her book Paranoia Switch, Stout ob-
serves the matter of terror and fear in the Ameri-
can society from a neuropsychological point of 
view. She presents a brief overview of U.S. history 
in regard to its “limbic wars, destructive struggles 
with small cadres of people who have tried to 
enlarge their projects or their influence by using 
whatever our collective anxieties happened to be 
at the time” /14/. Stout offers three examples from 
U.S. history: the rise of the Ku Klux Klan after the 
Civil War, the World War II internment of Japa-
nese-Americans, and McCarthyism, and applies 
her theory to the time after 9/11, as well. To show 
the phenomenon of fear-mongering in the media, 
she selected several headlines that appeared in the 
Los Angeles Times between December 1941 and 
February 1942, with which she argues that “the 
psychological tenor of the American press was 
terrifying” /14/. She conducted a comparable sur-
vey after 9/11 and found alarmingly similar re-
sults in headlines published in The New York Times 
between September 2001 and December 2002. She 
established that “fear once again became our lead-
ing story, along with the usual shades of fear-
consolidated allegiance” /14/. Apart from Stout’s 
examples, one can think of another occurrence of 
the American dual worldview, i.e., of our side vs. 
theirs: Altheide mentions that the bipolar rhetoric 
was typical of the Cold War era, too, dividing the 
world into two powers, the USA and Soviet Un-
ion. 
Stout describes six stages of every limbic 
war, stages which tend to overlap and can be easi-
ly applied to the period after 9/11. The first stage 
is usually a war or an attack, followed by group 
trauma or, as Stout puts it, “a traumatic event that 
installs a nonconscious paranoia switch in the 
minds of a nation’s citizens” /14/. The second 
stage involves fear broker(s) who “use the public’s 
fear to pursue a private agenda” /14/. These alter-
nate plans are usually power and control, and as 
Stout points out, “Authoritarian fear brokers re-
mind us, frequently and dramatically, of how 
much danger we are in, whether or not the re-
maining threat is significant or even real” /14/. 
People are then retraumatized, and people feeling 
frightened tend to seek solace in someone who 
simultaneously announces danger and promul-
gates himself as the protector. According to Stout, 
this stage is vital, as on it depends it whether a 
limbic war can happen at all—i.e. whether the 
nation decides to follow the fear brokers. The 
third stage is called scapegoatism, in which the 
leader blames another group or race of people for 
the crisis and uses “hatred’s poison as a tool” /14/. 
Often, during scapegoatism the allegedly guilty 
group of people “is only tangentially, or symboli-
cally—or not at all—related to the disaster that 
traumatized the nation in the first stage” /14/. 
After the scapegoats are determined, it is time for 
the fourth stage—cultural regression—which rep-
resents the peak of the process, demanding exact-
ing vengeance and causing intolerance. Stout clar-
ifies: “Typically, encouraging an us-versus-them 
atmosphere impels a tidal wave of patriotism 
across the traumatized nation” /14/. The fifth 
stage—recognition and backlash—is the beginning 
of the end of a limbic war when “protests begin, 
small and uneasy at the beginning, growing larger 
and bolder as time goes on” /14/. Regret and forget-
ting constitute the last stage of the process, when 
“fear begins to ease, often years later” but ques-
tions remain “why we allowed ourselves to be so 
easily co-opted into an authoritarian agenda” /14/.  
If one returns merely to the speech deliv-
ered by Bush to the American nation after the 
attacks, let alone to the events of 9/11, one could 
apply all these stages of a limbic war to the pro-
cess. The trauma of 9/11 as the first stage was 
amplified in the second by the nation’s leader: 
“Tonight we are a country awakened to danger 
[…] The terrorists’ directive commands them to 
kill Christians and Jews, to kill all Americans […] 
including women and children. […] There are 
thousands of these terrorists in more than sixty 
countries […] They stand against us, because we 
stand in their way” /13/. In the third stage, scape-
goats were immediately found to help “heighten 
the population’s anxiety and paranoia” /14/. Pres-
ident Bush was convinced that the attacks were 
committed by the “group [al-Qaeda] and its lead-
er—a person named Osama bin Laden” /13/. Lat-
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er, the administration began blaming not only 
Afghanistan, as in the first speech, but also Iraq. 
As Stout correctly indicated, there was that “pecu-
liar twist,” when the “offending out-group” is not 
related to the events. After some time, it became 
clear that the events of 9/11 were not connected to 
Iraq, “against which nation we [the American 
nation] unleashed the overwhelming force of our 
fear and rage” /14/. Even during the speech, Bush 
had begun to divide, which is typical of the fourth 
stage, not only the nation but the world into those 
who supported his authority and the plan of en-
hancing their political power behind it, and those 
who did not. He manipulated people by separat-
ing these two groups into good vs. evil, and by 
that stirred patriotic, even nationalistic emotions 
among American citizens. 
Soon after 9/11, the civil liberties of Amer-
ican people began to be seriously curtailed, as the 
government began strengthening security and 
exerting control, even over online communication 
and financial information. Pyszczynski, Solomon 
and Greenberg describe this intrusion into peo-
ple’s lives and reduction in their freedoms as 
some of the most tragic effects of the terrorist 
attacks: 
Security at airports has been increased massively. 
Long lines, hand searches of luggage, x-ray in-
spection of packages, chemical screening of shoes, 
and bodily pat downs are now an accepted part of 
air travel. The U.S. Congress acted quickly to 
heighten the power of law enforcement authori-
ties to conduct clandestine observations, includ-
ing wiretaps, searches, and other potential inva-
sions of our privacy. Random searches of cars, 
monitoring information on the Internet, and more 
careful scrutiny of foreign visitors are other ex-
amples of the steps being taken or proposed to 
increase our safety and avert the potential for 
future attacks /6/.  
Within weeks after the attacks, the Bush 
administration prepared an Act of Congress, 
called the USA PATRIOT Act, which is an acro-
nym for Uniting and Strengthening America by 
Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and 
Obstruct Terrorism Act. The Act passed the legisla-
tion immediately and fear ruled the nation for a 
while. Stout recalls that in the immediate after-
math “gun sales increased by as much as 50 per-
cent in some states, and according to FBI reports, 
background checks for handguns also rose dra-
matically” /14/.  Because of the overwhelming 
calls for safety from the government, Americans 
again felt frightened and felt the urge to protect 
themselves. 
Another public response that went hand 
in hand with the 9/11 events was the desperate 
need for protection, and thus for national heroes. 
The first proclaimed hero was the then current 
mayor of New York City, Rudy Giuliani. Silber-
stein declares: “As New York became America’s 
City, Giuliani became a national leader,” who in 
her opinion, “led through his dual rhetorics of 
strength and compassion” /3/. Correspondingly, 
on 8 October 2001 in his New Yorker piece “Rudy’s 
Rules,” Hendrik Hertzberg concurs: “In cheering 
Rudy, we have also been cheering our city, and 
our firefighters and our cops and our rescue 
workers” (Hertzberg). Furthermore, when writing 
about heroes, Pyszczynski, Solomon and Green-
berg delineate the behavior and attitude towards 
fire fighters and police workers at the time after 
the 9/11 crisis: “Police and fire personnel, both in 
the targeted cities and throughout the country, 
were hailed as heroes, finally getting some much 
deserved appreciation for their efforts […] The 
outpouring of admiration for the heroic helpers 
can be thought of as exemplifying this tendency to 
identify with heroes in response to reminders of 
our own finitude” /6/. Another indication of how 
strongly people felt about their heroes at the time 
was the October 29, 2001 cover of the weekly 
magazine The New Yorker. It pictured several chil-
dren at Halloween, dressed up exclusively as fire 
fighters and police officers and walking around 
New York City in their pursuit of trick-or-treat. 
Real heroes replaced super heroes in popular 
costumes.  
As is clear from subsequent events, how-
ever, stages five and six of a ‘limbic war’ fol-
lowed; people began doubting and later disagree-
ing with the invasion of Iraq and admitting to the 
mistakes committed. On November 25, 2001, Mi-
chael L. Rothschild published an article with the 
title “Terrorism and You—The Real Odds” in The 
Washington Post, where he assessed the probabil-
ity of a person falling victim to a terrorist attack. 
He established that the odds for such events were 
minimal; at the same time, Rothschild warned 
against the paranoia that was spreading across the 
country and encourages people to stay realistic: 
“While we need to be made aware of potential 
dangers, we also need to understand the true 
probabilities of these risks” (Rothschild). Never-
theless, on the first anniversary of the attacks, 
David Remnick and Hendrik Hertzberg wrote a 
41
Kristina Kočan Šalamon: PUBLIC RESPONSE TO 9/11 IN POLITICS: PATRIOTISM, FEAR AND LANGUAGE ISSUES 
Informatol. 51, 2018., 1-2, 34-42
ISSN 1330-0067                                                                                                                                                                          Coden: IORME7 
 
 
“A Year After” comment in the September 16, 
2002 New Yorker magazine, labeling the situation 
of the previous year thus: “A blind and righteous 
pacifism was not an option after September 11th” 
/18/. It is obvious that responses remained both 
various and conflicted. 
An important question, posed by Stout as 
well, follows: why does the general public accept 
the fear brokers and yield to fear and paranoia? 
She claims that because people have already been 
frightened and traumatized, it is relatively easy 
for leaders to increase “the fear of an entire popu-
lation of vulnerable people in the wake of a na-
tional trauma such as 9/11” /14/. According to 
Stout, it is not difficult to control “injured human 
beings by means of their reflexive, trauma-
instilled vulnerability to fear” /14/. Consequently, 
shocked and petrified people tend to remain faith-
ful to those promising to protect them, and to 
ignore the fact that “these self-avowed ‘protectors’ 
are also scaremongers” /14/. Stout makes an anal-
ogy with a battered wife who experiences a mix-
ture of emotional turmoil, “fear, paranoia, and 
submission” on the one side, and “the rise of au-
thoritarian protector” on the other /15/. She fur-
ther applies this example of an individual to the 
nation. 
Undoubtedly, the media helped politi-
cians to instigate fear and paranoia after 9/11. 
Several scholars have attempted to answer to 
what extent the media was influenced by politics 
and how much it echoed the politicians’ ideas. It 
has often been established that the 9/11 trauma 
was even hyper-magnified by the media, which 
consequently transformed the crisis into “virtual 
trauma,”8 a term coined by Marc Redfield, but this 
is already a topic of its own.  
Conclusion 
 The paper has focused on investigating 
the immediate public responses to the events of 
                                                          
8 Redfield understands the term “virtual” in this case as “the 
trembling of an event on the edge of becoming present: one 
that is not fully or not properly “actual” (Redfield 2). He con-
tinues to declare that the 9/11 trauma remained—at least for 
those who were not victims of the attacks—virtual; i.e. “some-
thing mediated, technically produced, not properly real” 
(Redfield 3). Redfield claims: “For those who had the protec-
tion of distance, the September 11 attacks were not “really” 
traumatic; they were a spectacle: a famously, infuriatingly 
cinematic spectacle” (Redfield 3). This physical, technological 
possibility of the virtual boomed just around 9/11, since the 
first years of the 21st century have seen rapid development of 
virtual reality. Also the movie “The Matrix” in 1999 had a 
considerable cultural impact. 
9/11. Moreover, the paper outlines the responses 
to 9/11 on the part of the then current political 
administration, portraying to what extent fear, 
patriotism and rhetoric in general in politics con-
tributed to the discourse of 9/11. With the aim of 
illustrating the rhetoric of politics after the events 
of 9/11, the paper looked at a speech delivered by 
the former U.S. President Bush on September 20, 
2001. This speech, as well as other political 
speeches of the time, showed traits of patriotism, 
even nationalism proclaiming America’s excep-
tionalism, expressing the wish to find the perpe-
trators as soon as possible, and emphasizing the 
danger the American nation was supposedly en-
countering. Since the events of 9/11 were a mass 
global event, repeatedly witnessed by all Ameri-
cans, it was not too difficult to spread fear among 
the already frightened nation. The paper also 
presented several polls that were conducted in the 
aftermath to document how the American nation 
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